<HashMap><database>biostudies-literature</database><scores/><additional><submitter>Lo Iacono S</submitter><funding>Dutch Research Council (NWO)</funding><pagination>pgad091</pagination><full_dataset_link>https://www.ebi.ac.uk/biostudies/studies/S-EPMC10153419</full_dataset_link><repository>biostudies-literature</repository><omics_type>Unknown</omics_type><volume>2(5)</volume><pubmed_abstract>Is peer sanctioning a sustainable solution to the problem of human cooperation? We conducted an exact multilab replication (&lt;i>N&lt;/i> = 1,008; 7 labs × 12 groups × 12 participants) of an experiment by Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach published in &lt;i>Science&lt;/i> in 2006 (Gürerk Ö, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B. The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. 2006. Science. 312(5770):108-111). In GIR2006 (&lt;i>N&lt;/i> = 84; 1 lab × 7 groups × 12 participants), groups that allowed members to reward cooperators and punish defectors were found to outgrow and outperform groups without a peer-sanctioning institution. We find GIR2006 replicated in accordance with all preregistered replication criteria in five of the seven labs we sampled. There, the majority of participants joined groups with a s</pubmed_abstract><journal>PNAS nexus</journal><pubmed_title>The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions revisited: A multilab replication.</pubmed_title><pmcid>PMC10153419</pmcid><funding_grant_id>401.18.015</funding_grant_id><pubmed_authors>Buskens V</pubmed_authors><pubmed_authors>Corten R</pubmed_authors><pubmed_authors>van Assen M</pubmed_authors><pubmed_authors>Lo Iacono S</pubmed_authors><pubmed_authors>Przepiorka W</pubmed_authors><pubmed_authors>van de Rijt A</pubmed_authors></additional><is_claimable>false</is_claimable><name>The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions revisited: A multilab replication.</name><description>Is peer sanctioning a sustainable solution to the problem of human cooperation? We conducted an exact multilab replication (&lt;i>N&lt;/i> = 1,008; 7 labs × 12 groups × 12 participants) of an experiment by Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach published in &lt;i>Science&lt;/i> in 2006 (Gürerk Ö, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B. The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. 2006. Science. 312(5770):108-111). In GIR2006 (&lt;i>N&lt;/i> = 84; 1 lab × 7 groups × 12 participants), groups that allowed members to reward cooperators and punish defectors were found to outgrow and outperform groups without a peer-sanctioning institution. We find GIR2006 replicated in accordance with all preregistered replication criteria in five of the seven labs we sampled. There, the majority of participants joined groups with a s</description><dates><release>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</release><publication>2023 May</publication><modification>2025-04-26T06:06:04.646Z</modification><creation>2025-02-19T02:26:14.652Z</creation></dates><accession>S-EPMC10153419</accession><cross_references><pubmed>37143865</pubmed><doi>10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad091</doi></cross_references></HashMap>