biostudies-literatureMontero-Porras EHORIZON EUROPE Widening Participation and Strengthening the European Research AreaFonds pour la Formation à la Recherche dans l’Industrie et dans l’AgricultureFonds Wetenschappelijk OnderzoekService Public de Walloniee0331348https://www.ebi.ac.uk/biostudies/studies/S-EPMC12425191biostudies-literatureUnknown20(9)Managing shared resources requires balancing personal profit and sustainability. This paper reports on a behavioural experiment testing how extraction defaults-either pro-social or exploitative-impact resource extraction in a common pool resource dilemma (CPRD). We find that an exploitative default increases average extraction compared to a control without a default, while a pro-social default temporarily reduces extraction. The effects of both defaults are temporary, and extraction levels converge to those in the control group, with the pro-social default fading faster. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under an exploitative default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. Our findings suggest that while defaults can promote short-term sustainability, their long-term effects are limited, and their effectiveness depends on individual traits.PloS oneFrom self-interest to collective action: The role of defaults in governing common resources.PMC124251919522153125723440007793G.0391.13N2010235-ARIAC40005955Suchon RMontero-Porras EFernandez Domingos ELenaerts TfalseFrom self-interest to collective action: The role of defaults in governing common resources.Managing shared resources requires balancing personal profit and sustainability. This paper reports on a behavioural experiment testing how extraction defaults-either pro-social or exploitative-impact resource extraction in a common pool resource dilemma (CPRD). We find that an exploitative default increases average extraction compared to a control without a default, while a pro-social default temporarily reduces extraction. The effects of both defaults are temporary, and extraction levels converge to those in the control group, with the pro-social default fading faster. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under an exploitative default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. Our findings suggest that while defaults can promote short-term sustainability, their long-term effects are limited, and their effectiveness depends on individual traits.2025-01-01T00:00:00Z20252026-06-03T02:25:20.376Z2026-04-23T03:10:01.934ZS-EPMC124251914093428310.1371/journal.pone.0331348