<HashMap><database>biostudies-literature</database><scores/><additional><omics_type>Unknown</omics_type><volume>6</volume><submitter>Zhang H</submitter><pubmed_abstract>We study the emergence of conditional cooperation in the presence of both intra-group and inter-group selection. Individuals play public goods games within their groups using conditional strategies, which are represented as piecewise linear response functions. Accordingly, groups engage in conflicts with a certain probability. In contrast to previous studies, we consider continuous contribution levels and a rich set of conditional strategies, allowing for a wide range of possible interactions between strategies. We find that the existence of conditional strategies enables the stabilization of cooperation even under strong intra-group selection. The strategy that eventually dominates in the population has two key properties: (i) It is unexploitable with strong intra-group selection; (ii) It</pubmed_abstract><journal>Scientific reports</journal><pagination>23006</pagination><full_dataset_link>https://www.ebi.ac.uk/biostudies/studies/S-EPMC4786827</full_dataset_link><repository>biostudies-literature</repository><pubmed_title>Evolution of conditional cooperation under multilevel selection.</pubmed_title><pmcid>PMC4786827</pmcid><pubmed_authors>Zhang H</pubmed_authors><pubmed_authors>Perc M</pubmed_authors></additional><is_claimable>false</is_claimable><name>Evolution of conditional cooperation under multilevel selection.</name><description>We study the emergence of conditional cooperation in the presence of both intra-group and inter-group selection. Individuals play public goods games within their groups using conditional strategies, which are represented as piecewise linear response functions. Accordingly, groups engage in conflicts with a certain probability. In contrast to previous studies, we consider continuous contribution levels and a rich set of conditional strategies, allowing for a wide range of possible interactions between strategies. We find that the existence of conditional strategies enables the stabilization of cooperation even under strong intra-group selection. The strategy that eventually dominates in the population has two key properties: (i) It is unexploitable with strong intra-group selection; (ii) It</description><dates><release>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</release><publication>2016 Mar</publication><modification>2025-04-18T22:04:03.805Z</modification><creation>2019-03-27T02:10:52Z</creation></dates><accession>S-EPMC4786827</accession><cross_references><pubmed>26965647</pubmed><doi>10.1038/srep23006</doi></cross_references></HashMap>