<HashMap><database>biostudies-literature</database><scores/><additional><omics_type>Unknown</omics_type><volume>55(4)</volume><submitter>Dowd BE</submitter><funding>Tow Foundation</funding><pubmed_abstract>&lt;h4>Objective&lt;/h4>To understand the effect of physician payment incentives on the allocation of health care resources.&lt;h4>Data sources/study setting&lt;/h4>Review and analysis of the literature on physician payment incentives.&lt;h4>Study design&lt;/h4>Analysis of current physician payment incentives and several ways to modify those incentives to encourage increased efficiency.&lt;h4>Principal findings&lt;/h4>Fee-for-service payments can be incorporated into systems that encourage efficient pricing - prices that are close to the provider's marginal cost - by giving consumers information on provider-specific prices and a strong incentive to choose lower cost providers. However, efficient pricing of services ultimately will need to be supplemented by incentives for efficient production of health and functional status.&lt;h4>Conclusions&lt;/h4>The problem with current FFS payment is not paying a fee for each service, per se, but the way in which the fees are determined.</pubmed_abstract><journal>Health services research</journal><pagination>491-495</pagination><full_dataset_link>https://www.ebi.ac.uk/biostudies/studies/S-EPMC7375993</full_dataset_link><repository>biostudies-literature</repository><pubmed_title>Fee-for-service payment is not the (main) problem.</pubmed_title><pmcid>PMC7375993</pmcid><pubmed_authors>Laugesen MJ</pubmed_authors><pubmed_authors>Dowd BE</pubmed_authors></additional><is_claimable>false</is_claimable><name>Fee-for-service payment is not the (main) problem.</name><description>&lt;h4>Objective&lt;/h4>To understand the effect of physician payment incentives on the allocation of health care resources.&lt;h4>Data sources/study setting&lt;/h4>Review and analysis of the literature on physician payment incentives.&lt;h4>Study design&lt;/h4>Analysis of current physician payment incentives and several ways to modify those incentives to encourage increased efficiency.&lt;h4>Principal findings&lt;/h4>Fee-for-service payments can be incorporated into systems that encourage efficient pricing - prices that are close to the provider's marginal cost - by giving consumers information on provider-specific prices and a strong incentive to choose lower cost providers. However, efficient pricing of services ultimately will need to be supplemented by incentives for efficient production of health and functional status.&lt;h4>Conclusions&lt;/h4>The problem with current FFS payment is not paying a fee for each service, per se, but the way in which the fees are determined.</description><dates><release>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</release><publication>2020 Aug</publication><modification>2024-02-15T20:44:18.847Z</modification><creation>2022-02-11T00:16:06.499Z</creation></dates><accession>S-EPMC7375993</accession><cross_references><pubmed>32700387</pubmed><doi>10.1111/1475-6773.13316</doi></cross_references></HashMap>