<HashMap><database>biostudies-literature</database><scores/><additional><submitter>Valdez S</submitter><funding>Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality</funding><funding>AHRQ HHS</funding><pagination>469580211022968</pagination><full_dataset_link>https://www.ebi.ac.uk/biostudies/studies/S-EPMC8287339</full_dataset_link><repository>biostudies-literature</repository><omics_type>Unknown</omics_type><volume>58</volume><pubmed_abstract>Within the past decade, the U.S. health care market has undergone massive vertical integration, prompting economists to study the underlying causes and consequences of hospital-physician integration. This paper examines whether or not hospitals strategically choose to vertically integrate with clinical oncologists in order to capture facility fees, a commonly cited reason for increased consolidation in the health care market. To address this question, I match data on hospitals' ownership of clinical oncologists with Medicare payment data disaggregated to the physician and specific service level. I leverage a 2014 policy change that drastically altered the payment structure of Medicare's facility fees paid to hospitals for evaluation and management services-and yet, it did not alter the direct payments made to physicians. Contrary to popular belief, I find no evidence that the financial incentives of facility fees have an effect on the probability that a hospital and a clinical oncologist vertically integrate.</pubmed_abstract><journal>Inquiry : a journal of medical care organization, provision and financing</journal><pubmed_title>Do Medicare's Facility Fees Incentivize Hospitals to Vertically Integrate with Oncologists?</pubmed_title><pmcid>PMC8287339</pmcid><funding_grant_id>T32 HS000046</funding_grant_id><funding_grant_id>2T32HS000046</funding_grant_id><pubmed_authors>Valdez S</pubmed_authors></additional><is_claimable>false</is_claimable><name>Do Medicare's Facility Fees Incentivize Hospitals to Vertically Integrate with Oncologists?</name><description>Within the past decade, the U.S. health care market has undergone massive vertical integration, prompting economists to study the underlying causes and consequences of hospital-physician integration. This paper examines whether or not hospitals strategically choose to vertically integrate with clinical oncologists in order to capture facility fees, a commonly cited reason for increased consolidation in the health care market. To address this question, I match data on hospitals' ownership of clinical oncologists with Medicare payment data disaggregated to the physician and specific service level. I leverage a 2014 policy change that drastically altered the payment structure of Medicare's facility fees paid to hospitals for evaluation and management services-and yet, it did not alter the direct payments made to physicians. Contrary to popular belief, I find no evidence that the financial incentives of facility fees have an effect on the probability that a hospital and a clinical oncologist vertically integrate.</description><dates><release>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</release><publication>2021 Jan-Dec</publication><modification>2024-11-14T01:16:14.875Z</modification><creation>2022-02-11T02:40:54.787Z</creation></dates><accession>S-EPMC8287339</accession><cross_references><pubmed>34269086</pubmed><doi>10.1177/00469580211022968</doi></cross_references></HashMap>