<HashMap><database>biostudies-literature</database><scores/><additional><submitter>Leshin RA</submitter><funding>Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development</funding><funding>NICHD NIH HHS</funding><pagination>e531-e547</pagination><full_dataset_link>https://www.ebi.ac.uk/biostudies/studies/S-EPMC9446473</full_dataset_link><repository>biostudies-literature</repository><omics_type>Unknown</omics_type><volume>92(4)</volume><pubmed_abstract>A problematic way to think about social categories is to essentialize them-to treat particular differences between people as marking fundamentally distinct social kinds. From where do these beliefs arise? Language that expresses generic claims about categories elicits some aspects of essentialism, but the scope of these effects remains unclear. This study (N = 204, ages 4.5-8 years, 73% White; recruited predominantly from the United States and the United Kingdom to participate online in 2019) found that generic language increases two critical aspects of essentialist thought: Beliefs that (a) category-related properties arise from intrinsic causal mechanisms and (b) category boundaries are inflexible. These findings have implications for understanding the spread of essentialist beliefs acro</pubmed_abstract><journal>Child development</journal><pubmed_title>Does It Matter How We Speak About Social Kinds? A Large, Preregistered, Online Experimental Study of How Language Shapes the Development of Essentialist Beliefs.</pubmed_title><pmcid>PMC9446473</pmcid><funding_grant_id>R01HD087672</funding_grant_id><funding_grant_id>R01 HD087672</funding_grant_id><pubmed_authors>Rhodes M</pubmed_authors><pubmed_authors>Leshin RA</pubmed_authors><pubmed_authors>Leslie SJ</pubmed_authors></additional><is_claimable>false</is_claimable><name>Does It Matter How We Speak About Social Kinds? A Large, Preregistered, Online Experimental Study of How Language Shapes the Development of Essentialist Beliefs.</name><description>A problematic way to think about social categories is to essentialize them-to treat particular differences between people as marking fundamentally distinct social kinds. From where do these beliefs arise? Language that expresses generic claims about categories elicits some aspects of essentialism, but the scope of these effects remains unclear. This study (N = 204, ages 4.5-8 years, 73% White; recruited predominantly from the United States and the United Kingdom to participate online in 2019) found that generic language increases two critical aspects of essentialist thought: Beliefs that (a) category-related properties arise from intrinsic causal mechanisms and (b) category boundaries are inflexible. These findings have implications for understanding the spread of essentialist beliefs acro</description><dates><release>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</release><publication>2021 Jul</publication><modification>2025-04-19T00:28:04.635Z</modification><creation>2024-11-07T03:43:29.709Z</creation></dates><accession>S-EPMC9446473</accession><cross_references><pubmed>33511701</pubmed><doi>10.1111/cdev.13527</doi></cross_references></HashMap>