Estimation of bargaining effect in the decision of monetary compensation of executive in investment bank: Evidence from China.

ABSTRACT: Though numerous empirical and theoretical studies have been conducted on the determinants and effects of executive compensation, empirical evidence regarding the bargaining effect on the monetary compensation decisions of executives, especially in a large emerging economy such as China, remains scarce. In this study, a two-tier stochastic frontier and endogenous correction model was developed to quantitatively estimate the bargaining effect on the monetary compensation decisions of investment bank executives. Our study is the first to provide comprehensive empirical evidence that bargaining between investment banks and executives in China significantly affects the compensation decisions of executives. In the bargaining process, investment banks are more proficient than executives, and the

SUBMITTER: Yu L 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10062542 | biostudies-literature | 2023

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature