Natural statistics support a rational account of confidence biases.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Webb TW
PROVIDER: S-EPMC10326055 | biostudies-literature | 2023 Jul
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Natural statistics support a rational account of confidence biases.
Webb Taylor W TW Miyoshi Kiyofumi K So Tsz Yan TY Rajananda Sivananda S Lau Hakwan H
Nature communications 20230706 1
Previous work has sought to understand decision confidence as a prediction of the probability that a decision will be correct, leading to debate over whether these predictions are optimal, and whether they rely on the same decision variable as decisions themselves. This work has generally relied on idealized, low-dimensional models, necessitating strong assumptions about the representations over which confidence is computed. To address this, we used deep neural networks to develop a model of dec ...[more]
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