The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games.

ABSTRACT: Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or

SUBMITTER: Kleshnina M 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10338504 | biostudies-literature | 2023 Jul

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature