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Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game.

ABSTRACT: With the implementation of the double carbon plan, this paper considers the delivery fees of two risk averse logistics companies under carbon cap and trade mechanism. We establish logistics company Stackelberg (MS) model and retailer Stackelberg (RS) model under mean variance (MV) framework, respectively. We obtain the optimal delivery fees and retail prices. We find out that the higher degree of risk aversion can lead to a lower delivery fee. We also show that a higher carbon trading price or a higher cross price sensitivity will increase delivery fees. Moreover, we indicate that the performances of logistics companies under MS scenario are higher than that RS scenario. In addition, we suggest that under the carbon cap and trade rules, in order to obtain higher profits, logistics companies should use fuel vehicle for transportation under certain conditions, and use electric vehicle in other cases.

SUBMITTER: Huang F

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10355466 | biostudies-literature | 2023

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game.

Huang Fuyou F Liu Bin B Tao Baoquan B Deng Yuankang Y Ma Chao C

PloS one 20230719 7

With the implementation of the double carbon plan, this paper considers the delivery fees of two risk averse logistics companies under carbon cap and trade mechanism. We establish logistics company Stackelberg (MS) model and retailer Stackelberg (RS) model under mean variance (MV) framework, respectively. We obtain the optimal delivery fees and retail prices. We find out that the higher degree of risk aversion can lead to a lower delivery fee. We also show that a higher carbon trading price or a ...[more]

PMID: 37467212

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Project description:In the context of environmental deterioration and people's growing environmental protection awareness, governments or regions have put forward corresponding carbon emission reduction policies. Among them, the carbon trading mechanism, as an effective means to promote enterprises to implement emission reduction measures, plays a crucial role in regulating enterprise behavior and promoting social sustainable development. Since various industries and sectors support each other in social and economic development, it is more reasonable to study the carbon emission reduction optimization decisions of society and enterprises from the perspective of the supply chain. To achieve the carbon reduction target of the supply chain system, manufacturing enterprises usually need to incur additional costs to invest in emission reduction technologies, and retail enterprises also need to conduct low-carbon publicity to increase product market share. On one hand, considering the impact of the government's emission reduction constraints and consumers' low-carbon preferences, manufacturers will take corporate social responsibility (CSR) into consideration to enhance product competitiveness. On the other hand, smaller retailers are more concerned about being treated fairly than about their own profits due to the extra cost of low-carbon advertising. In this paper, considering the background of carbon trading, the manufacturer's CSR and retailer's fairness concern behavior are introduced into the decision-making process of the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), and the relevant emission reduction decision-making model is constructed by using Stackelberg game theory and backward derivation method. Through comparative analysis of relevant parameters, members' profits and utilities, this paper focuses on the influence of CSR and fairness concerns on system decision-making. The results show that the optimal way for LCSC decision-making is to cooperate with fair-concerned retailers and manufacturers with CSR. When manufacturers consider social responsibility within a certain range and retailers bear part of the cost of social responsibility as followers, it can not only effectively improve the emission reduction level of the supply chain and the profits of each entity, but also help to increase the enthusiasm of each entity for carbon emission reduction and the overall social welfare.

Dataset Information

Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game.

Publications

Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game.

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