Rational social distancing in epidemics with uncertain vaccination timing.

ABSTRACT: During epidemics people may reduce their social and economic activity to lower their risk of infection. Such social distancing strategies will depend on information about the course of the epidemic but also on when they expect the epidemic to end, for instance due to vaccination. Typically it is difficult to make optimal decisions, because the available information is incomplete and uncertain. Here, we show how optimal decision-making depends on information about vaccination timing in a differential game in which individual decision-making gives rise to Nash equilibria, and the arrival of the vaccine is described by a probability distribution. We predict stronger social distancing the earlier the vaccination is expected and also the more sharply peaked its probability distribution. In part

SUBMITTER: Schnyder SK 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10361534 | biostudies-literature | 2023

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature