Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: coordination and equilibrium selection.

ABSTRACT: We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We investigate three possible update rules: the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). Players interact on a two-layer random regular network. The population on each layer plays a different game, with layer I preferring the opposite strategy to layer II. We measure the difference between the two games played on the layers by a difference in payoffs, and the inter-connectedness by a node overlap parameter. We discover a critical value of the overlap below which layers do not synchronise, i.e. they display different levels of coordination. Above this threshold both layers typically coordinate on the same stra

SUBMITTER: Raducha T 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10362047 | biostudies-literature | 2023 Jul

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature