Co-evolution of conditional cooperation and social norm.

ABSTRACT: The co-evolution of conditional cooperation and social norms has garnered significant attention, yet the underlying mechanisms remain elusive. Social norms result from empirical expectations, individual expectations of group behavior, and normative expectations, the population's expectations of individual behavior. Aligning these expectations aids in norm formation, but diverse individual reactions to observed behavior and their sensitivity to norm conformity can be challenging. In our study, the agents are initially endowed with diverse conditional expectations, which mirror their anticipations regarding group behavior and their inherent inclination to conform to social norms, indicative of their sensitivity to psychic costs. These agents engage in a repeated public goods game, where thei

SUBMITTER: Battu B 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10547722 | biostudies-literature | 2023 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature