Project description:Previous research has shown that voters' perception of electoral fairness has an impact on their attitudes and behaviors. However, less research has attempted to link objective measurements of electoral integrity on voters' attitudes about the democratic process. Drawing on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the Quality of Elections Data, we investigate whether cross-national differences in electoral integrity have significant influences on citizens' level of satisfaction with democracy. We hypothesize that higher levels of observed electoral fraud will have a negative impact on evaluations of the democratic process, and that this effect will be mediated by a respondent's status as a winner or loser of an election. The article's main finding is that high levels of electoral fraud are indeed linked to less satisfaction with democracy. However, we show that winning only matters in elections that are conducted in an impartial way. The moment elections start to display the telltale signs of manipulation and malpractice, winning and losing no longer have different effects on voter's levels of satisfaction with democracy.
Project description:Donald Trump's 2016 win despite failing to carry the popular vote has raised concern that 2020 would also see a mismatch between the winner of the popular vote and the winner of the Electoral College. This paper shows how to forecast the electoral vote in 2020 taking into account the unknown popular vote and the configuration of state voting in 2016. We note that 2016 was a statistical outlier. The potential Electoral College bias was slimmer in the past and not always favoring the Republican candidate. We show that in past presidential elections, difference among states in their presidential voting is solely a function of the states' most recent presidential voting (plus new shocks); earlier history does not matter. Based on thousands of simulations, our research suggests that the bias in 2020 probably will favor Trump again but to a lesser degree than in 2016. The range of possible outcomes is sufficiently wide, however, to even include some possibility that Joseph Biden could win in the Electoral College while barely losing the popular vote.
Project description:About one third of American voters cast a vote more "against" than "for" a candidate in the 2020 Presidential election. This pattern, designated by negative voting, has been initially understood by rational choice scholarship as a product of cognitive dissonance and/or retrospective evaluations. This article revisits this concept through the affective polarization framework in the light of the rise of political sectarianism in American society. Based on an original CAWI survey fielded after the 2020 election, our regression analysis demonstrates that the predicted probability of casting a negative vote significantly increases among individuals for whom out-candidate hate outweighs in-candidate love. Negative voting is less prevalent among partisans as their higher levels of in-group affection can offset out-group contempt. By asserting the enduring relevance of negative voting in American presidential elections, we aim at stimulating further research and discussion of its implications for democratic representation.
Project description:This article presents unique survey data focused on local democracy, political attitudes and political participation. The main aim of the research was to understand the relationships between political values, political participation, political knowledge and voting behavior at the local level. The survey was held at autumn 2018 after local elections in the Czech Republic. The data are unique in terms of their focus on local politics combined with variables that are standardly examined in the context of national politics. The dataset links research fields that are directly related to local politics (local electoral participation, local electoral behavior, local non-electoral participation, trust in local institutions and evaluation of local policy efficacy) with the fields usually connected with national politics (political interest, trust in institutions, political cynicism, populist attitudes and political knowledge). Research also looks at attitudes towards democracy as such. The provided data can be used by scholars in the field of local politics, local governance and electoral behavior. Data are comparable to other large-scale individual level surveys, or may serve as data source for meta-analysis.
Project description:The 2020 U.S. Presidential Election required voters to not only form opinions of leading candidates, Donald Trump and Joe Biden, but also to make judgments about the integrity of the election itself and what—if anything—to do about it. However, partisan motivated reasoning theory (Leeper and Slothuus, Political Psychology, 35(Suppl 1): 129–156; Lodge and Taber, The rationalizing voter, Cambridge University Press, 2013) suggests judgments are often strongly influenced toward affectively desirable conclusions. Before, during, and after election projections were announced, partisan supporters of Trump and Biden rated: judgments about voter fraud and foreign interference, their acceptance of the results, and their support for recourse against the outcome (e.g., legal challenges, legislative overhauls, violence). Before the election, partisans were mildly concerned about election integrity but willing to accept the outcome without recourse. However, during vote counting, and especially after Biden was projected to be the winner, partisans dramatically changed their judgments in opposite directions, consistent with the affectively desirable conclusions relevant to each group. Biden supporters affirmed the election’s integrity and accepted the results whereas Trump supporters disputed the integrity, rejected the results, and began to support recourse against the outcome. Data are consistent with partisan motivated reasoning. Discussion highlights the practical implications. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11031-022-09983-w.
Project description:Policy Points The erosion of electoral democracy in the United States in recent decades may have contributed to the high and rising working-age mortality rates, which predate the COVID-19 pandemic. Eroding electoral democracy in a US state was associated with higher working-age mortality from homicide, suicide, and especially from drug poisoning and infectious disease. State and federal efforts to strengthen electoral democracy, such as banning partisan gerrymandering, improving voter enfranchisement, and reforming campaign finance laws, could potentially avert thousands of deaths each year among working-age adults.ContextWorking-age mortality rates are high and rising in the United States, an alarming fact that predates the COVID-19 pandemic. Although several reasons for the high and rising rates have been hypothesized, the potential role of democratic erosion has been overlooked. This study examined the association between electoral democracy and working-age mortality and assessed how economic, behavioral, and social factors may have contributed to it.MethodsWe used the State Democracy Index (SDI), an annual summary of each state's electoral democracy from 2000 to 2018. We merged the SDI with annual age-adjusted mortality rates for adults 25-64 years in each state. Models estimated the association between the SDI and working-age mortality (from all causes and six specific causes) within states, adjusting for political party control, safety net generosity, union coverage, immigrant population, and stable characteristics of states. We assessed whether economic (income, unemployment), behavioral (alcohol consumption, sleep), and social (marriage, violent crime, incarceration) factors accounted for the association.FindingsIncreasing electoral democracy in a state from a moderate level (defined as the third quintile of the SDI distribution) to a high level (defined as the fifth quintile) was associated with an estimated 3.2% and 2.7% lower mortality rate among working-age men and women, respectively, over the next year. Increasing electoral democracy in all states from the third to the fifth quintile of the SDI distribution may have resulted in 20,408 fewer working-age deaths in 2019. The democracy-mortality association mainly reflected social factors and, to a lesser extent, health behaviors. Increasing electoral democracy in a state was mostly strongly associated with lower mortality from drug poisoning and infectious diseases, followed by reductions in homicide and suicide.ConclusionsErosion of electoral democracy is a threat to population health. This study adds to growing evidence that electoral democracy and population health are inextricably linked.
Project description:Inversions-in which the popular vote winner loses the election-have occurred in four US presidential races. We show that rather than being statistical flukes, inversions have been ex ante likely since the early 1800s. In elections yielding a popular vote margin within 1 point (one-eighth of presidential elections), about 40 percent will be inversions in expectation. We show this conditional probability is remarkably stable across historical periods-despite differences in which groups voted, which states existed, and which parties participated. Our findings imply that the United States has experienced so few inversions merely because there have been so few elections (and fewer close elections).
Project description:Local or national politics can be a catalyst for potentially dangerous hate speech. But with a third of the world's population eligible to vote in 2024 elections, we need an understanding of how individual-level hate multiplies up to the collective global scale. We show, based on the most recent U.S. presidential election, that offline events are associated with rapid adaptations of the global online hate universe that strengthens both its network-of-networks structure and the types of hate content that it collectively produces. Approximately 50 million accounts in hate communities are drawn closer to each other and to a broad mainstream of billions. The election triggered new hate content at scale around immigration, ethnicity, and antisemitism that aligns with conspiracy theories about Jewish-led replacement. Telegram acts as a key hardening agent; yet, it is overlooked by U.S. Congressional hearings and new E.U. legislation. Because the hate universe has remained robust since 2020, anti-hate messaging surrounding global events (e.g., upcoming elections or the war in Gaza) should pivot to blending multiple hate types while targeting previously untouched social media structures.
Project description:Electoral fraud is a widespread phenomenon, especially outside the developed world. Despite abundant qualitative and anecdotal evidence on its existence from around the world, there is very limited quantitative evidence on the extent of electoral fraud. We exploit random assignment of independent observers to 156 of 3,164 polling stations in the city of Moscow to estimate the effect of electoral fraud on the outcome of the Russian parliamentary elections held on December 4, 2011. We estimate the actual share of votes for the incumbent United Russia party to be at least 11 percentage points lower than the official count (36% instead of 47%). Our results suggest that the extent of the fraud was sufficient to have had a substantial impact on the outcome of the elections; they also confirm that the presence of observers is an important factor in ensuring the integrity of the procedure.
Project description:BackgroundThe 2016 presidential election and the controversial policy agenda of its victor have raised concerns about how the election may have impacted mental health.ObjectiveAssess how mental health changed from before to after the November 2016 election and how trends differed in states that voted for Donald Trump versus Hillary Clinton.DesignPre- versus post-election study using monthly cross-sectional survey data.ParticipantsA total of 499,201 adults surveyed in the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System from May 2016 to May 2017.ExposureResidence in a state that voted for Trump versus state that voted for Clinton and the candidate's margin of victory in the state.Main measuresSelf-reported days of poor mental health in the last 30 days and depression rate.Key resultsCompared to October 2016, the mean days of poor mental health in the last 30 days per adult rose from 3.35 to 3.85 in December 2016 in Clinton states (0.50 days difference, p = 0.005) but remained statistically unchanged in Trump states, moving from 3.94 to 3.78 days (- 0.17 difference, p = 0.308). The rises in poor mental health days in Clinton states were driven by older adults, women, and white individuals. The depression rate in Clinton states began rising in January 2017. A 10-percentage point higher margin of victory for Clinton in a state predicted 0.41 more days of poor mental health per adult in December 2016 on average (p = 0.001).ConclusionsIn states that voted for Clinton, there were 54.6 million more days of poor mental health among adults in December 2016, the month following the election, compared to October 2016. Clinicians should consider that elections could cause at least transitory increases in poor mental health and tailor patient care accordingly, especially with the 2020 election upon us.