Supply chain decision based on green investment subsidy and risk aversion.

ABSTRACT: Considering the risk aversion characteristics of supply chain members, how to effectively design the government subsidy strategy and green supply chain strategy is a realistic and urgent issue. Regarding this, we optimize and compare four three-stage Stackelberg game models between government and a two-echelon green supply chain, namely both manufacturer and retailer risk neutral (BN), manufacturer risk aversion while retailer risk neutral (MA), retailer risk aversion while manufacturer risk neutral (RA) and both manufacturer and retailer risk aversion (BA). The government as the leader decides the subsidy rate of green input cost with the goal of maximizing social welfare; the manufacturer as the first follower makes decisions on product greenness and wholesale price to maximize its own i

SUBMITTER: Liu P 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10627464 | biostudies-literature | 2023

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature