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Complaints about Violations of Voluntary and Pharmaceutical Industry-Run Medicine Promotion Codes in Canada.

ABSTRACT: Although regulation of pharmaceutical promotion in Canada is covered under the Food & Drugs Act and Regulations, in practice it is regulated by two codes, one a code administered by the Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board and a second one controlled by Innovative Medicines Canada, the lobby organization for the large majority of the Canadian and foreign-owned pharmaceutical companies operating in Canada. This study examines complaints about code violations between 2012 and 2021 and puts those complaints and their outcomes into the context of the stringency of the codes, their governance, monitoring, penalties for violations, and compliance by companies. It combines the findings from this analysis with international experience with industry-run codes and concludes that overall, the Canadian codes are ineffective in controlling promotion. Finally, it offers recommendations for how regulation can be improved and how doctors' reliance on information from pharmaceutical companies can be reduced.

SUBMITTER: Lexchin J

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10631264 | biostudies-literature | 2023 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Complaints about Violations of Voluntary and Pharmaceutical Industry-Run Medicine Promotion Codes in Canada.

Lexchin Joel J

International journal of social determinants of health and health services 20230320 4

Although regulation of pharmaceutical promotion in Canada is covered under the Food & Drugs Act and Regulations, in practice it is regulated by two codes, one a code administered by the Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board and a second one controlled by Innovative Medicines Canada, the lobby organization for the large majority of the Canadian and foreign-owned pharmaceutical companies operating in Canada. This study examines complaints about code violations between 2012 and 2021 and puts th ...[more]

PMID: 36938584

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Project description:BackgroundIn many European countries, medicines promotion is governed by voluntary codes of practice administered by the pharmaceutical industry under its own system of self-regulation. Involvement of industry organizations in policing promotion has been proposed to deter illicit conduct, but few detailed studies on self-regulation have been carried out to date. The objective of this study was to examine the evidence for promotion and self-regulation in the UK and Sweden, two countries frequently cited as examples of effective self-regulation.Methods and findingsWe performed a qualitative content analysis of documents outlining the constitutions and procedures of these two systems. We also gathered data from self-regulatory bodies on complaints, complainants, and rulings for the period 2004-2012. The qualitative analysis revealed similarities and differences between the countries. For example, self-regulatory bodies in both countries are required to actively monitor promotional items and impose sanctions on violating companies, but the range of sanctions is greater in the UK where companies may, for instance, be audited or publicly reprimanded. In total, Swedish and UK bodies ruled that 536 and 597 cases, respectively, were in breach, equating to an average of more than one case/week for each country. In Sweden, 430 (47%) complaints resulted from active monitoring, compared with only two complaints (0.2%) in the UK. In both countries, a majority of violations concerned misleading promotion. Charges incurred on companies averaged €447,000 and €765,000 per year in Sweden and the UK, respectively, equivalent to about 0.014% and 0.0051% of annual sales revenues, respectively. One hundred cases in the UK (17% of total cases in breach) and 101 (19%) in Sweden were highlighted as particularly serious. A total of 46 companies were ruled in breach of code for a serious offence at least once in the two countries combined (n = 36 in the UK; n = 27 in Sweden); seven companies were in serious violation more than ten times each. A qualitative content analysis of serious violations pertaining to diabetes drugs (UK, n = 15; Sweden, n = 6; 10% of serious violations) and urologics (UK, n = 6; Sweden, n = 13; 9%) revealed various types of violations: misleading claims (n = 23; 58%); failure to comply with undertakings (n = 9; 23%); pre-licensing (n = 7; 18%) or off-label promotion (n = 2; 5%); and promotion of prescription drugs to the public (n = 6; 15%). Violations that go undetected or unpunished by self-regulatory bodies are the main limitation of this study, since they are likely to lead to an underestimate of industry misconduct.ConclusionsThe prevalence and severity of breaches testifies to a discrepancy between the ethical standard codified in industry Codes of Conduct and the actual conduct of the industry. We discuss regulatory reforms that may improve the quality of medicines information, such as pre-vetting and intensified active monitoring of promotion, along with larger fines, and giving greater publicity to rulings. But despite the importance of improving regulatory arrangements in an attempt to ensure unbiased medicines information, such efforts alone are insufficient because simply improving oversight and increasing penalties fail to address additional layers of industry bias.

Project description:BackgroundCompeting claims are made about the amount of money that pharmaceutical companies spend on research and development (R&D) versus promotion. This study investigates this question in the Canadian context.MethodsTwo methods for determining industry-wide figures for spending on promotion were employed. First, total industry spending on detailing and journal advertising for 2013-2016 was abstracted from reports from QuintilesIMS. Second, the mean total promotion spending for the years 2002-2005 was used to estimate total spending for 2013-2016. Total industry spending on R&D came from the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB). R&D to promotion spending using each method of determining the amount spent on promotion was compared for 2013-2016 inclusive. Data on the 50 top promoted drugs, the amounts spent, the companies marketing these products and their overall sales were abstracted from the QuintilesIMS reports. Spending on R&D and promotion as a percent of sales was compared for these companies.ResultsIndustry wide, the ratio of R&D to promotion spending went from 1.43 to 2.18 when promotion was defined as the amount spent on detailing and journal advertising for the 50 most promoted drugs. Calculating total promotion spending from the mean of the 2002-2005 figures the ratio was 0.88 to 1.32 for the 50 most promoted drugs. For individual companies marketing one or more of the 50 most promoted drugs, mean R&D spending ranged from 3.7% of sales to 4.1% compared to mean promotion spending that went from 1.7 to 1.9%. The ratio of spending on R&D to promotion varied from 2.11 to 2.32. Eight to 10 companies per year spent more on promotion than on R&D.ConclusionsDepending on the method used to determine promotion spending, industry-wide the ratio of R&D spending to promotion ranges from 1.45 to 2.18 (sales representatives and journal advertising only) or from 0.88 to 1.32 (total promotion spending estimated based 2003-2005 data.) For the individual companies promoting one or more of the 50 most promoted drugs, 2.11 to 2.32 times more is spent on R&D compared to promotion. However these results should be interpreted cautiously because of data limitations.

Project description:BackgroundThere has been increased demand for greater public accountability and transparency of private sector-led global health partnership programs. This study critically reviews and pilot tests the World Health Organization (WHO) medicine program checklist as a framework for public reporting and assessing of programs.MethodsWe reviewed each question on the WHO checklist for clarity and usability. Next, we pilot tested the subset of checklist questions focused on program assessment. We extracted and analyzed publicly available information on one randomly selected program from each of the 20 largest research-based biopharmaceutical companies. For each program, we assessed whether publicly available information allowed for an assessment of each relevant question in the checklist.ResultsChecklist questions fit in four main categories: [1] national health and development plans, needs, capacity, laws and policies; [2] financial, performance, and public accountability; [3] risk management and mitigation strategies; and [4] long-term sustainability. Nearly all (21 of 22) questions in the checklist require information best provided by companies; one question requires information best provided by governments.Programs frequently reported on the public health needs of their programs (100%), program objectives and activities (100%) and the actual or expected program outputs (95%). There was less information on program alignment with country plans and capacity (50%), detailed program monitoring and evaluation plan (20%), risks mitigation strategies (5%), program needs assessment (5%), and additional resources required from or contributed by government (0%).ConclusionThe WHO checklist of key considerations for evaluating proposals for access to medicine programs could be a useful framework for public reporting of program information as most of checklist questions ask for data that should be available to those leading the program. Further revisions of the WHO checklist will help refine it to improve clarity and content validity.

Project description:BackgroundEuropean Union law prohibits companies from marketing drugs off-label. In the United Kingdom--as in some other European countries, but unlike the United States--industry self-regulatory bodies are tasked with supervising compliance with marketing rules. The objectives of this study were to (1) characterize off-label promotion rulings in the UK compared to the whistleblower-initiated cases in the US and (2) shed light on the UK self-regulatory mechanism for detecting, deterring, and sanctioning off-label promotion.Methods and findingsWe conducted structured reviews of rulings by the UK self-regulatory authority, the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority (PMCPA), between 2003 and 2012. There were 74 off-label promotion rulings involving 43 companies and 65 drugs. Nineteen companies were ruled in breach more than once, and ten companies were ruled in breach three or more times over the 10-y period. Drawing on a typology previously developed to analyse US whistleblower complaints, we coded and analysed the apparent strategic goals of each off-label marketing scheme and the practices consistent with those alleged goals. 50% of rulings cited efforts to expand drug use to unapproved indications, and 39% and 38% cited efforts to expand beyond approved disease entities and dosing strategies, respectively. The most frequently described promotional tactic was attempts to influence prescribers (n = 72, 97%), using print material (70/72, 97%), for example, advertisements (21/70, 30%). Although rulings cited prescribers as the prime target of off-label promotion, competing companies lodged the majority of complaints (prescriber: n = 16, 22%, versus companies: n = 42, 57%). Unlike US whistleblower complaints, few UK rulings described practices targeting consumers (n = 3, 4%), payers (n = 2, 3%), or company staff (n = 2, 3%). Eight UK rulings (11%) pertaining to six drugs described promotion of the same drug for the same off-label use as was alleged by whistleblowers in the US. However, while the UK cases typically related to only one or a few claims made in printed material, several complaints in the US alleged multifaceted and covert marketing activities. Because this study is limited to PMCPA rulings and whistleblower-initiated federal cases, it may offer a partial view of exposed off-label marketing.ConclusionThe UK self-regulatory system for exposing marketing violations relies largely on complaints from company outsiders, which may explain why most off-label promotion rulings relate to plainly visible promotional activities such as advertising. This contrasts with the US, where Department of Justice investigations and whistleblower testimony have alleged complex off-label marketing campaigns that remain concealed to company outsiders. UK authorities should consider introducing increased incentives and protections for whistleblowers combined with US-style governmental investigations and meaningful sanctions. UK prescribers should be attentive to, and increasingly report, off-label promotion.

Dataset Information

Complaints about Violations of Voluntary and Pharmaceutical Industry-Run Medicine Promotion Codes in Canada.

Publications

Complaints about Violations of Voluntary and Pharmaceutical Industry-Run Medicine Promotion Codes in Canada.

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