Effectivenes of incentive constraint policies in enhancing green bond credit rating and certification: A theoretical and empirical study.

ABSTRACT: This paper aims to effectively reduce CO2 emissions by examining the impact of three distinct incentive and constraint policies on the quality of rating and certification information in China's green bond issuance market. To accomplish this, the government has implemented incentives, while regulators have introduced constraints to curb the spread of inflated rating and certification information. We build on the integrated rating and certification regulation mechanism by presenting a two-stage Stackelberg game model that involves four key participants: the China Securities Regulatory Commission, local governments, green evaluation and certification agencies, and credit rating agencies. We incorporate environmental effects indicators into the expected utility of rating and certification agen

SUBMITTER: Zhao H 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10653487 | biostudies-literature | 2023

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature