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Protocol for an agent-based model of recombination in bacteria playing a public goods game.

ABSTRACT: Agent-based models are composed of individual agents coded for traits, such as cooperation and cheating, that interact in a virtual world based on defined rules. Here, we describe the use of an agent-based model of homologous recombination in bacteria playing a public goods game. We describe steps for software installation, setting model parameters, running and testing models, and visualization and statistical analysis. This protocol is useful in analyses of horizontal gene transfer, bacterial sociobiology, and game theory. For complete details on the use and execution of this protocol, please refer to Lee et al.¹.

SUBMITTER: Lee IPA

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10694748 | biostudies-literature | 2023 Nov

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Protocol for an agent-based model of recombination in bacteria playing a public goods game.

Lee Isaiah Paolo A IPA Eldakar Omar Tonsi OT Gogarten J Peter JP Andam Cheryl P CP

STAR protocols 20231118 4

Agent-based models are composed of individual agents coded for traits, such as cooperation and cheating, that interact in a virtual world based on defined rules. Here, we describe the use of an agent-based model of homologous recombination in bacteria playing a public goods game. We describe steps for software installation, setting model parameters, running and testing models, and visualization and statistical analysis. This protocol is useful in analyses of horizontal gene transfer, bacterial s ...[more]

PMID: 37980566

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