The effect of internal salary incentives based on insurance payment on physicians' behavior: experimental evidence.

ABSTRACT:

Background

Understanding how physicians respond to payment methods is crucial for designing effective incentives and enhancing the insurance system. Previous theoretical research has explored the effects of payment methods on physician behavior based on a two-level incentive path; however, empirical evidence to validate these theoretical frameworks is lacking. To address this research gap, we conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate physicians' behavioral responses to three types of internal salary incentives based on diagnosis-related-group (DRG) and fee-for-service (FFS).

Methods

A total of 150 medical students from Capital Medical University were recruited as participants. These subjects played the role of physicians in choosing the quantity of medical services fo

SUBMITTER: Li X 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10720113 | biostudies-literature | 2023 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature