A conceptional game theory analysis of environmental public interest litigation of China.

ABSTRACT: China introduced civil and administrative public interest litigation (PIL) through a series of pilot projects and legislative revisions in recent years. Now a procuratorate has the standing to bring civil PIL cases against polluters and administrative PIL cases against administrative agencies in its jurisdictions while a qualified non-governmental organization (NGO) has no geographic limits and may bring civil PIL cases against polluters anywhere in mainland China. Previous literature focused on the use of PIL for redressing environmental damages in individual cases. This paper studies the function of PIL beyond individual cases with game theory. This paper uses data collected through autoethnography, interviews, databases of judgements, statistics, and previous literature. This paper find

SUBMITTER: Wang H 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10839607 | biostudies-literature | 2024 Feb

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature