A study on the evolution of tripartite collaborative prevention and control under public health emergencies using COVID-19 as an example.

ABSTRACT: The problem of repeated epidemic fluctuations in the normalized prevention and control stage is revealed by data from January 20, 2020, to January 30, 2023. In order to improve the collaborative response of the public and government departments to public health emergencies and avoid repeated fluctuations of the epidemic, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the public, local government, and central government departments is constructed, focusing on the evolutionary paths and evolutionary stabilization strategies of the three subjects, and the influence of each element on the evolutionary results is simulated by numerical simulation in Matlab, and based on the inadequacy of the static reward and punishment mechanism, a dynamic Based on the shortcomings of static reward and punishment mec

SUBMITTER: Mingyue L 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10850330 | biostudies-literature | 2024 Feb

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature