Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.
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ABSTRACT: Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for cooperation in social dilemmas. The very logic of reciprocity, however, seems to require that individuals are symmetric, and that everyone has the same means to influence each others' payoffs. Yet in many applications, individuals are asymmetric. Herein, we study the effect of asymmetry in linear public good games. Individuals may differ in their endowments (their ability to contribute to a public good) and in their productivities (how effective their contributions are). Given the individuals' productivities, we ask which allocation of endowments is optimal for cooperation. To this end, we consider two notions of optimality. The first notion focuses on the resilience of cooperation. The respective endowment distribution ensures that full coope
SUBMITTER: Hubner V
PROVIDER: S-EPMC10927524 | biostudies-literature | 2024 Mar
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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