The influence of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the governance level of state-owned enterprises--Based on the perspective of board resolution behavior and party organization governance.

ABSTRACT: With an increasing number of heterogeneous shareholders participating in corporate governance in reality, the assumption of shareholder homogeneity in agency theory is gradually relaxing in the modern field of corporate governance. The policy of mixed ownership reform in China provides empirical evidence for studying heterogeneous shareholder governance. To fully understand the governance effects of non-state shareholders, we employ the ownership proportion held by non-state shareholders among the top ten shareholders and the appointment of directors as measures for non-state shareholder governance. Using a panel fixed-effect model from the perspective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) party organizations, we examine the impact of non-state shareholder governance on the governance level of

SUBMITTER: Zhang Z 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC11065267 | biostudies-literature | 2024

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature