Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

ABSTRACT: Establishing and maintaining mutual cooperation in agent-to-agent interactions can be viewed as a question of direct reciprocity and readily applied to the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Agents cooperate, at a small cost to themselves, in the hope of obtaining a future benefit. Zero-determinant strategies, introduced in 2012, have a subclass of strategies that are provably extortionate. In the established literature, most of the studies of the effectiveness or lack thereof, of zero-determinant strategies is done by placing some zero-determinant strategy in a specific scenario (collection of agents) and evaluating its performance either numerically or theoretically. Extortionate strategies are algebraically rigid and memory-one by definition, and requires complete knowledge of a strategy (the

SUBMITTER: Knight V 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC11280246 | biostudies-literature | 2024

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature