Project description:Trustworthiness is a foundation of well-functioning relationships and societies, and thus often perceived as a socially normative behaviour. Correspondingly, a broad array of research found that people tend to act in a trustworthy way and signal their trustworthiness to others, and that trustworthiness is rewarded. Herein, we explore whether this motivation to behave trustworthily can have socially undesirable effects in terms of leading to dishonesty targeted at fulfilling the trustor's expectations (i.e. trustworthy dishonesty). Furthermore, we examine how the basic trait of Honesty-Humility, which has consistently been found to be linked to both higher honesty and trustworthiness, relates to trustworthy dishonesty, where honesty and trustworthiness are at odds. Specifically, we conducted three pre-registered studies (N = 7080), introducing a novel behavioural game, the lying-trust game, where participants had a chance to lie to act trustworthily. In two studies, we found that, when offered 'full trust', participants high in Honesty-Humility (i.e. the top 10%) engaged in trustworthy dishonesty, i.e. lied in order to avoid maximizing their own incentive at the cost of minimizing the incentive of their trustor. This pattern was not present when the trustor offered minimal trust only, as well as among participants low in Honesty-Humility (i.e. the bottom 10%).
Project description:Cognitive control is crucially involved in making (dis)honest decisions. However, the precise nature of this role has been hotly debated. Is honesty an intuitive response, or is will power needed to override an intuitive inclination to cheat? A reconciliation of these conflicting views proposes that cognitive control enables dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it allows those who are generally honest to cheat. Thus, cognitive control does not promote (dis)honesty per se; it depends on one's moral default. In the present study, we tested this proposal using electroencephalograms in humans (males and females) in combination with an independent localizer (Stroop task) to mitigate the problem of reverse inference. Our analysis revealed that the neural signature evoked by cognitive control demands in the Stroop task can be used to estimate (dis)honest choices in an independent cheating task, providing converging evidence that cognitive control can indeed help honest participants to cheat, whereas it facilitates honesty for cheaters.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Dishonesty causes enormous economic losses. To target dishonesty with interventions, a rigorous understanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms is required. A recent study found that cognitive control enables honest participants to cheat, whereas it helps cheaters to be honest. However, it is evident that a single study does not suffice as support for a novel hypothesis. Therefore, we tested the replicability of this finding using a different modality (EEG instead of fMRI) together with an independent localizer task to avoid reverse inference. We find that the same neural signature evoked by cognitive control demands in the localizer task can be used to estimate (dis)honesty in an independent cheating task, establishing converging evidence that the effect of cognitive control indeed depends on a person's moral default.
Project description:Dishonesty has an enormous impact on all aspects of our society. It causes huge financial losses annually, so efforts to understand dishonest behavior have increased. However, one of the main questions yet to be answered is whether dishonesty varies according to gender. Do men behave more dishonestly than women? Although the literature points to a yes, there is still no consensus on the matter. We examined gender differences in dishonesty in a large sample (N = 2,452) using a model recently developed by Pascual-Ezama et al. It is a variation of the classic die-under-the-cup task. It enabled us to identify individual dishonesty profiles and look for gender differences between them. The results show that the men were more prone to behave dishonestly than women with small rewards, who seem satisfied without maximizing the potential reward. However, the differences vanished when there was no reward. The men also showed more radical dishonest behavior than the women. The results also suggest that gender differences might be shaped by factors other than gender.
Project description:In daily life we regularly must decide whether to act dishonestly for personal gain or to be honest and maintain a positive image of ourselves. While evidence suggests that acute stress influences moral decisions, it is unclear whether stress increases or decreases immoral behavior. Here, we hypothesize that stress, through its effects on cognitive control, has different effects on moral decision making for different individuals, depending on their moral default. We test this hypothesis by combining a task which allows for inconspicuously measuring spontaneous cheating with a well-established stress induction task. Our findings confirm our hypothesis, revealing that effects of stress on dishonesty are not uniform, but instead depend on the individual: for those who are relatively dishonest, stress increases dishonesty, whereas for participants who are relatively honest stress makes them more honest. These findings go a long way in resolving the conflicting findings in the literature on the effects of stress on moral decisions, suggesting that stress affects dishonesty differently for different individuals, depending on their moral default.
Project description:Individuals differ profoundly when they decide whether to tell the truth or to be dishonest, particularly in situations where moral motives clash with economic motives, i.e., when truthfulness comes at a monetary cost. These differences should be expressed in the decision network, particularly in prefrontal cortex. However, the interactions between the core players of the decision network during honesty-related decisions involving trade-offs with economic costs remain poorly understood. To investigate brain connectivity patterns associated with individual differences in responding to economic costs of truthfulness, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and measured brain activations, while participants made decisions concerning honesty. We found that in participants who valued honesty highly, dorsolateral and dorsomedial parts of prefrontal cortex were more tightly coupled with the inferior frontal cortex when economic costs were high compared to when they were low. Finer-grained analysis revealed that information flow from the inferior frontal cortex to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bidirectional information flow between the inferior frontal cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex was associated with a reduced tendency to trade off honesty for economic benefits. Our findings provide a novel account of the neural circuitry that underlies honest decisions in the face of economic temptations.
Project description:ObjectivesThe aim of this study was to modify a speech perception in noise test to assess whether the presence of another individual (copresence), relative to being alone, affected listening performance and effort expenditure. Furthermore, this study assessed if the effect of the other individual's presence on listening effort was influenced by the difficulty of the task and whether participants had to repeat the sentences they listened to or not.DesignThirty-four young, normal-hearing participants (mean age: 24.7 years) listened to spoken Dutch sentences that were masked with a stationary noise masker and presented through a loudspeaker. The participants alternated between repeating sentences (active condition) and not repeating sentences (passive condition). They did this either alone or together with another participant in the booth. When together, participants took turns repeating sentences. The speech-in-noise test was performed adaptively at three intelligibility levels (20%, 50%, and 80% sentences correct) in a block-wise fashion. During testing, pupil size was recorded as an objective outcome measure of listening effort.ResultsLower speech intelligibility levels were associated with increased peak pupil dilation (PPDs) and doing the task in the presence of another individual (compared with doing it alone) significantly increased PPD. No interaction effect between intelligibility and copresence on PPD was found. The results suggested that the change of PPD between doing the task alone or together was especially apparent for people who started the experiment in the presence of another individual. Furthermore, PPD was significantly lower during passive listening, compared with active listening. Finally, it seemed that performance was unaffected by copresence.ConclusionThe increased PPDs during listening in the presence of another participant suggest that more effort was invested during the task. However, it seems that the additional effort did not result in a change of performance. This study showed that at least one aspect of the social context of a listening situation (in this case copresence) can affect listening effort, indicating that social context might be important to consider in future cognitive hearing research.
Project description:To protect and promote the well-being of others, humans may bend the truth and behave unethically. Here we link such tendencies to oxytocin, a neuropeptide known to promote affiliation and cooperation with others. Using a simple coin-toss prediction task in which participants could dishonestly report their performance levels to benefit their group's outcome, we tested the prediction that oxytocin increases group-serving dishonesty. A double-blind, placebo-controlled experiment allowing individuals to lie privately and anonymously to benefit themselves and fellow group members showed that healthy males (n = 60) receiving intranasal oxytocin, rather than placebo, lied more to benefit their group, and did so faster, yet did not necessarily do so because they expected reciprocal dishonesty from fellow group members. Treatment effects emerged when lying had financial consequences and money could be gained; when losses were at stake, individuals in placebo and oxytocin conditions lied to similar degrees. In a control condition (n = 60) in which dishonesty only benefited participants themselves, but not fellow group members, oxytocin did not influence lying. Together, these findings fit a functional perspective on morality revealing dishonesty to be plastic and rooted in evolved neurobiological circuitries, and align with work showing that oxytocin shifts the decision-maker's focus from self to group interests. These findings highlight the role of bonding and cooperation in shaping dishonesty, providing insight into when and why collaboration turns into corruption.
Project description:This paper introduces frame-specific randomization devices to vary the situational context of an online lying experiment. Participants are asked to report outcomes of random draws from two different sources of uncertainty-decimals of the value of a stock index or a neutrally framed random number generator. The findings show that the frame-specific randomization device is not prone to the social norm effects documented in the literature. Because different environments can evoke different norms, I replicate the experiment in the more constrained setting of a traditional physical laboratory revealing no systematic differences in behavior. Furthermore, I am not able to show that participants who take longer to report are more honest and this is specific to the physical laboratory environment. Finally, the findings reveal gender differences in honesty depending on the environment-males are more honest when they participate in the laboratory as opposed to online.
Project description:Dishonesty is an integral part of our social world, influencing domains ranging from finance and politics to personal relationships. Anecdotally, digressions from a moral code are often described as a series of small breaches that grow over time. Here we provide empirical evidence for a gradual escalation of self-serving dishonesty and reveal a neural mechanism supporting it. Behaviorally, we show that the extent to which participants engage in self-serving dishonesty increases with repetition. Using functional MRI, we show that signal reduction in the amygdala is sensitive to the history of dishonest behavior, consistent with adaptation. Critically, the extent of reduced amygdala sensitivity to dishonesty on a present decision relative to the previous one predicts the magnitude of escalation of self-serving dishonesty on the next decision. The findings uncover a biological mechanism that supports a 'slippery slope': what begins as small acts of dishonesty can escalate into larger transgressions.
Project description:When telling a lie, humans might engage in stronger monitoring of their behavior than when telling the truth. Initial evidence has indeed pointed towards a stronger recruitment of capacity-limited monitoring processes in dishonest than honest responding, conceivably resulting from the necessity to overcome automatic tendencies to respond honestly. Previous results suggested monitoring to be confined to response execution, however, whereas the current study goes beyond these findings by specifically probing for post-execution monitoring. Participants responded (dis)honestly to simple yes/no questions in a first task and switched to an unrelated second task after a response-stimulus interval of 0 ms or 1000 ms. Dishonest responses did not only prolong response times in Task 1, but also in Task 2 with a short response-stimulus interval. These findings support the assumption that increased monitoring for dishonest responses extends beyond mere response execution, a mechanism that is possibly tuned to assess the successful completion of a dishonest act.