Increasing benefits in one-time public goods does not promote cooperation.

ABSTRACT: The long tradition of research on cooperation includes a well-established finding that individuals respond to the degree of conflict between self- and collective interests (that is, the relative benefits from cooperation) in providing public goods. Existing empirical evidence builds upon settings where participants make multiple decisions or strategically consider alternative scenarios. Here, we consider a decision setting where participants face a one-time (single-decision) setting. One-time cooperative encounters often occur in volunteering or donating to immediate needs for crisis relief. For these distinct and highly relevant settings, we report a lack of responsiveness to increases in cooperation benefits, thereby highlighting limits to our understanding of the determinants of one-tim

SUBMITTER: Struwe N 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC11474087 | biostudies-literature | 2024 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature