Anything for a cheerio: Brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) consistently coordinate in an Assurance Game for unequal payoffs.

ABSTRACT: Unequal outcomes disrupt cooperation in some situations, but this has not been tested in the context of coordination in economic games. To explore this, we tested brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) on a manual version of the Stag Hunt (or Assurance) Game, in which individuals sequentially chose between two options, Stag or Hare, and were rewarded according to their choices and that of their partner. Typically, coordination on Stag results in an equal highest payout, whereas coordinating on Hare results in a guaranteed equal but lower payoff and uncoordinated play results in the lowest payoff when playing Stag. We varied this structure such that one capuchin received double the rewards for the coordinated Stag outcome; thus, it was still both animals' best option, but no longer equall

SUBMITTER: Robinson LM 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC11475490 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature