Research on technological innovation decision-making considering government subsidies and corporate reputation.

ABSTRACT: Aiming at the information asymmetry between pharmaceutical enterprises' technological innovation decisions and government subsidy strategy, this paper establishes a differential game model consisting of the government and a single pharmaceutical company, proposes three different government subsidy strategies, and obtains an equilibrium solution with the help of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, taking into consideration of the transmission effect of the enterprise's reputation. First, the innovation decisions of pharmaceutical firms without government subsidies are analysed, and based on this, the optimal strategies with government subsidies for non-cooperative pacts and cooperation between the government and enterprises are analysed separately. In addition, the effects of different su

SUBMITTER: Kang Y 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC11781664 | biostudies-literature | 2025

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature