Evolutionary game model for the behavior of private sectors in elderly healthcare public-private partnership under the condition of information asymmetry.

ABSTRACT: Chinese elderly healthcare services face problems of poor service quality, difficulty in eliminating hidden quality risks, and inadequate government supervision, primarily due to information asymmetry and insufficient supervision among providers, users, and regulatory bodies. The study addresses two key questions: How does information asymmetry influence private sector strategies in elderly healthcare public-private partnership (PPP), and what regulatory models can overcome the potential shortcomings? The study examines the influence of information asymmetry, particularly on "experience" and "credence," crucial for governance and service quality in elderly healthcare PPPs in China. By developing the novel methodology of evolutionary game theory and employing MATLAB simulations, this study

SUBMITTER: Yue X 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC11783943 | biostudies-literature | 2025 Jan

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature