Territorial-sneaker games with non-uniform interactions and female mate choice.

ABSTRACT: Male territorial-sneaker polymorphisms are common in nature. To understand how these polymorphisms evolve, we developed a game theoretical model analogous to the classical Hawk-Dove model, but with two important differences. First, we allowed non-uniform interaction rates of strategies to account for the possibility that some interactions between male strategies are disproportionately more frequent than others. Second, we allowed females to exhibit a preference for one type of male and thereby choose mates adaptively. Selection dynamics were modeled using coupled replicator equations. The model confirms that there is a broad range of conditions under which a male polymorphism will arise. We applied the model to understand the genetic polymorphism in adult male Mnais damselflies (Zyg

SUBMITTER: Sherratt TN 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC11786120 | biostudies-literature | 2025 Mar-Apr

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature