Deliberation during online bargaining reveals strategic information.

ABSTRACT: A standard assumption in game theory is that decision-makers have preplanned strategies telling them what actions to take for every contingency. In contrast, nonstrategic decisions often involve an on-the-spot comparison process, with longer response times (RT) for choices between more similarly appealing options. If strategic decisions also exhibit these patterns, then RT might betray private information and alter game theory predictions. Here, we examined bargaining behavior to determine whether RT reveals private information in strategic settings. Using preexisting and experimental data from eBay, we show that both buyers and sellers take hours longer to accept bad offers and to reject good offers. We find nearly identical patterns in the two datasets, indicating a causal effect of offe

SUBMITTER: Cotet M 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC11848323 | biostudies-literature | 2025 Feb

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature