Humans program artificial delegates to accurately solve collective-risk dilemmas but lack precision.

ABSTRACT: In an era increasingly influenced by autonomous machines, it is only a matter of time before strategic individual decisions that impact collective goods will also be made virtually through the use of artificial delegates. Through a series of behavioral experiments that combine delegation to autonomous agents and different choice architectures, we pinpoint what may get lost in translation when humans delegate to algorithms. We focus on the collective-risk dilemma, a game where participants must decide whether or not to contribute to a public good, where the latter must reach a target in order for them to keep their personal endowments. To test the effect of delegation beyond its functionality as a commitment device, participants are asked to play the game a second time, with the same group,

SUBMITTER: Terrucha I 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC12207457 | biostudies-literature | 2025 Jun

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature