Institutions of public judgment established by social contract and taxation.
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ABSTRACT: Indirect reciprocity is a compelling explanation for stable cooperation in a large society: Those who cooperate appropriately earn a good standing, so that others are more likely to cooperate with them. However, this mechanism requires a population to agree on who has good standing and who has bad standing. Consensus can be provided by a central institution that monitors and broadcasts reputations. But how might such an institution be maintained, and how can a population ensure that it is effective and incorruptible? Here, we explore a simple mechanism to sustain an institution for judging reputations: a tax collected from each member of the population. We analyze the possible tax rate that individuals will rationally pay to sustain an institution of judgment, which provides a public good
SUBMITTER: Kessinger TA
PROVIDER: S-EPMC12232642 | biostudies-literature | 2025 Jul
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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