Dynamic complexity of Stackelberg-Bertrand game with one-way R&D spillovers, effective information and government subsidies.

ABSTRACT: The phenomena of bounded rationality, asymmetric information, research and development (R&D) spillovers represent ubiquitous characteristics in economic systems, yet research simultaneously investigating R&D spillovers and information asymmetry within a bounded rationality framework remains scarce. This study innovatively incorporates one-way R&D spillovers, effective information, and government R&D subsidies into a dynamical two-stage Stackelberg-Bertrand model. Through application of Jury criterion, we systematically analyze the stability characteristics of all equilibrium points, derive stability conditions and stable regions, and investigate the complex dynamics of this discrete system. The principal findings reveal that: (1) Enhanced effective information for the R&D leader and increa

SUBMITTER: Long J 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC12303324 | biostudies-literature | 2025

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature