Modeling and simulation of railway safety management with public supervision and dynamic incentives: A four-party evolutionary game and system dynamics approach.

ABSTRACT: Railway accidents pose a significant threat to the industry, necessitating enhanced research into railway transportation safety. This study integrated a public oversight framework into the existing safety governance structure of railway transport operators, utilizing a four-party evolutionary game model and system dynamics for enhancement. Simulations conducted with Vensim software demonstrate that increased public supervision increases safety operation rates and improves the safety-related productivity of auxiliary enterprises. However, uncertainties in the evolutionary strategy process were identified. To address equilibrium fluctuations, a dynamic reward-punishment mechanism was developed. The optimized system achieved a safety operation rate of 99.7%, enhanced the safety-related produc

SUBMITTER: Li X 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC12360609 | biostudies-literature | 2025

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature