Is Wrenn's Strong Virtue Theory of the value of truth too strong?

ABSTRACT: In The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth (2023), Wrenn argues for a strong virtue theory of the value of truth. What makes truth valuable is Truthfulness, a human virtue. We value truth because we ought to be Truthful, and not vice versa (state-given). Therefore, he argues that the truth of a proposition as such does not confer value to states of believing it. I disagree. I argue that Wrenn's Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth is either too strong or simply false. In any case, my main argument is based on a thought experiment that is supposed to challenge his theory, and pump our intuition that truth as such confers value on states of believing it (object-given). I also point to some issues that concern the compatibility of

SUBMITTER: Melkonian-Altshuler S 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC12553566 | biostudies-literature | 2025

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature