Non-dilemmatic social dynamics promote cooperation in multilayer networks.

ABSTRACT: Various theoretical and empirical studies have accounted for why humans cooperate in competitive environments. Although prior work has revealed that network structure and multiplex interactions can promote cooperation, most theory assumes that individuals play similar dilemma games in all social contexts. However, real-world agents may participate in a diversity of interactions, not all of which present dilemmas. We develop an evolutionary game model on multilayer networks in which one layer supports the prisoner's dilemma game, while the other follows constant-selection dynamics, representing biased but non-dilemmatic competition, akin to opinion or fad spreading. Our theoretical analysis reveals that coupling a social dilemma layer to a non-dilemmatic constant-selection layer robustly en

SUBMITTER: Bhaumik J 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC12772680 | biostudies-literature | 2026 Jan

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature