A game theoretic treatment of contagion in trade networks.

ABSTRACT: Global trade of material goods involves the potential to create pathways for the spread of infectious pathogens. One trade sector in which this synergy is clearly critical is that of wildlife trade networks. This highly complex system involves important and understudied bidirectional coupling between the economic decision making of the stakeholders and the contagion dynamics on the emergent trade network. While each of these components are independently well studied, there is a meaningful gap in understanding the feedback dynamics that can arise between them. In the present study, we describe a general game theoretic model for trade networks of goods susceptible to contagion. The primary result relies on the acyclic nature of the trade network and shows that, through the course of trading

SUBMITTER: McAlister JS 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC12788693 | biostudies-literature | 2025 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature