Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation.

ABSTRACT: Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadershi

SUBMITTER: O'Gorman R 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC2674351 | biostudies-literature | 2009 Jan

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature