Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N-person stag hunt dilemmas.

ABSTRACT: In the animal world, collective action to shelter, protect and nourish requires the cooperation of group members. Among humans, many situations require the cooperation of more than two individuals simultaneously. Most of the relevant literature has focused on an extreme case, the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma. Here we introduce a model in which a threshold less than the total group is required to produce benefits, with increasing participation leading to increasing productivity. This model constitutes a generalization of the two-person stag hunt game to an N-person game. Both finite and infinite population models are studied. In infinite populations this leads to a rich dynamics that admits multiple equilibria. Scenarios of defector dominance, pure coordination or coexistence may arise simul

SUBMITTER: Pacheco JM 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC2674356 | biostudies-literature | 2009 Jan

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature