Critical dynamics in the evolution of stochastic strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.

ABSTRACT: The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to the selfish goal of survival inherent in Darwinian evolution. In order to resolve this paradox, evolutionary game theory has focused on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), which incorporates the essence of this conflict. Here, we encode strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) in terms of conditional probabilities that represent the response of decision pathways given previous plays. We find that if these stochastic strategies are encoded as genes that undergo Darwinian evolution, the environmental conditions that the strategies are adapting to dete

SUBMITTER: Iliopoulos D 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC2951343 | biostudies-literature | 2010 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature