Emergence of segregation in evolving social networks.

ABSTRACT: In many social networks, there is a high correlation between the similarity of actors and the existence of relationships between them. This paper introduces a model of network evolution where actors are assumed to have a small aversion from being connected to others who are dissimilar to themselves, and yet no actor strictly prefers a segregated network. This model is motivated by Schelling's [Schelling TC (1969) Models of segregation. Am Econ Rev 59:488-493] classic model of residential segregation, and we show that Schelling's results also apply to the structure of networks; namely, segregated networks always emerge regardless of the level of aversion. In addition, we prove analytically that attribute similarity among connected network actors always reaches a stationary distribution, and

SUBMITTER: Henry AD 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3102387 | biostudies-literature | 2011 May

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature