To qualify as a social partner, humans hide severe punishment, although their observed cooperativeness is decisive.

ABSTRACT: Conflicts of interest between the community and its members are at the core of human social dilemmas. If observed selfishness has future costs, individuals may hide selfish acts but display altruistic ones, and peers aim at identifying the most selfish persons to avoid them as future social partners. An interaction involving hiding and seeking information may be inevitable. We staged an experimental social-dilemma game in which actors could pay to conceal information about their contribution, giving, and punishing decisions from an observer who selects her future social partners from the actors. The observer could pay to conceal her observation of the actors. We found sophisticated dynamic strategies on either side. Actors hide their severe punishment and low contributions but display high

SUBMITTER: Rockenbach B 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3215000 | biostudies-literature | 2011 Nov

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature