Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.

ABSTRACT: Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations

SUBMITTER: Zhang F 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3220694 | biostudies-literature | 2011

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature