Contaminated soil and transmission of influenza virus (H5N1).
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Gutierrez RA
PROVIDER: S-EPMC3437732 | biostudies-literature | 2012 Sep
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Contaminated soil and transmission of influenza virus (H5N1).
Gutiérrez Ramona A RA Buchy Philippe P
Emerging infectious diseases 20120901 9
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