Instability in evolutionary games.

ABSTRACT:

Background

Phenomena of instability are widely observed in many dissimilar systems, with punctuated equilibrium in biological evolution and economic crises being noticeable examples. Recent studies suggested that such instabilities, quantified by the abrupt changes of the composition of individuals, could result within the framework of a collection of individuals interacting through the prisoner's dilemma and incorporating three mechanisms: (i) imitation and mutation, (ii) preferred selection on successful individuals, and (iii) networking effects.

Methodology/principal findings

We study the importance of each mechanism using simplified models. The models are studied numerically and analytically via rate equations and mean-field approximation. It is shown that imitation and

SUBMITTER: Yang Z 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3510218 | biostudies-literature | 2012

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature