Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

ABSTRACT: The strong reciprocity model of the evolution of human cooperation has gained some acceptance, partly on the basis of support from experimental findings. The observation that unfair offers in the ultimatum game are frequently rejected constitutes an important piece of the experimental evidence for strong reciprocity. In the present study, we have challenged the idea that the rejection response in the ultimatum game provides evidence of the assumption held by strong reciprocity theorists that negative reciprocity observed in the ultimatum game is inseparably related to positive reciprocity as the two sides of a preference for fairness. The prediction of an inseparable relationship between positive and negative reciprocity was rejected on the basis of the results of a series of experiments t

SUBMITTER: Yamagishi T 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3528519 | biostudies-literature | 2012 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature