From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

ABSTRACT: Recent work has revealed a new class of "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies for iterated, two-player games. ZD strategies allow a player to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between her score and her opponent's score, and thus to achieve an unusual degree of control over both players' long-term payoffs. Although originally conceived in the context of classical two-player game theory, ZD strategies also have consequences in evolving populations of players. Here, we explore the evolutionary prospects for ZD strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD). Several recent studies have focused on the evolution of "extortion strategies," a subset of ZD strategies, and have found them to be unsuccessful in populations. Nevertheless, we identify a different subset of ZD strategies, cal

SUBMITTER: Stewart AJ 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3780848 | biostudies-literature | 2013 Sep

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature