Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks.

ABSTRACT: We explore the evolutionary dynamics of two games-the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game-played within distinct networks (layers) of interdependent networks. In these networks imitation and interaction between individuals of opposite layers is established through interlinks. We explore an update rule in which revision of strategies is a biased imitation process: individuals imitate neighbors from the same layer with probability p, and neighbors from the second layer with complementary probability 1 - p. We demonstrate that a small decrease of p from p = 1 (which corresponds to forbidding strategy transfer between layers) is sufficient to promote cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma subpopulation. This, on the other hand, is detrimental for cooperation in the Snowdrift Game subpopul

SUBMITTER: Santos MD 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3963071 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Mar

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature