Influences of agents with a self-reputation awareness component in an evolutionary spatial IPD game.

ABSTRACT: Iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) researchers have shown that strong positive reputations plus an efficient reputation evaluation system encourages both sides to pursue long-term collaboration and to avoid falling into mutual defection cycles. In agent-based environments with reliable reputation rating systems, agents interested in maximizing their private interests must show concern for other agents as well as their own self-reputations--an important capability that standard IPD game agents lack. Here we present a novel learning agent model possessing self-reputation awareness. Agents in our proposed model are capable of evaluating self-behaviors based on a mix of public and private interest considerations, and of testing various solutions aimed at meeting social standards. Simulation res

SUBMITTER: Huang CY 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4063756 | biostudies-literature | 2014

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature